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BOOK REVIEWS
Jurisprudence. By RoscoB PouND. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1959. 5 Vols.
Pp. xxvii, 547, 466, 738, 543, 855. $90.00.
It has proved extremely difficult for me to work out a review of this bookchiefly, I think, because the book will mean such different things to different
groups of men. Thus if you are the ordinary reasonably intelligent but very
busy lawyer, a review ought probably to state that this holds rather little for
you, and, so far as it does hold anything, is too expensive, at its enormous
price, and that it is too sprawling in its organization to be accessible.
But if you are a lawyer with an interest in the wider aspects of his profession
who is also taking some time off for serious reading, this may be a very good
book for you indeed. One thing is sure: there is nothing gathered in English
which reports the same general range of legal thinking as does this. In the
main, moreover, the ideas, like their sources, are translated into languageand often into application-which we can all understand. And the whole is
infused with the powerful and critical home-grown insight about us-folk, our
legal problems, and our legal ways, which has been the foundation of Pound's
greatness and which has been so strikingly absent in so many (I do not mean,
e.g., Radin or the Cohens or Seagle or Cairns) who have quarried abroad not
to enrich, but to substitute. If you are this inquiring lawyer, you will meet
skillful presentation and critique of law-directed thinking especially from the
Latin, the German and the French, informed by an encyclopedic acquaintance
with Anglo-American judicial writing up to say 1930 which few have ever
matched. The result will lift your eyes, stir your mind, and, it may be hoped,
refresh your soul. It will also ornament your shelf: bound in handsome brown
with Roscoe Pound's signature in gold, and with the paper thick or thin as may
be needed to make all five volumes harmonious in bulk.
If you are another type of reader or public, you begin carpingly by asking
why the end-results of the most prolific writer on Jurisprudence in our language should come feather bedded in wide margins, half in extra-large type
and fatted paper, with much of the most pungent older stuff cut out, and with
an index which screeches its inadequacy. As one of the professionals in the
field who began with this reaction (one goes on, e.g., to find no substantial
mention or understanding of Arnold, of either Cohen, of Cahn, Fuller,
Michael, Radin, or Seagle, all of whom were writing while Pound was still in
powerful spate)-as one such, let me start here by reminding my brethren that
if they read they will find these volumes full of clich ideas-somewhat in the
manner of Shakespeare. Pound is indeed no Shakespeare; nevertheless, to
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take an instance, the basic content of, say, Law in Books and Law in Action,1
The Limits of Effective Legal Action,2 Spurious Interpretation,3 Mechanical
Jurisprudence,4 etc., is the basis of our forward-looking thought of the '20's
and '30's and has provided half of the commonplace equipment on and with
which our work since has builded. It is not to the point that I have not found
these particular papers reproduced in text in the present volume, much less
rearranged and expanded as is Justice According to Law;5 their flavor and
ideas are nevertheless present. So is the turning of eye and mind to other-thanEnglish sources, where Pound, even more than Wigmore and Kocourek, and
Radin, laid the foundation for the American lawyer to broaden and deepen
his vision-a foundation which even world tragedy and threatened disaster
have found it hard to persuade that same American lawyer that he truly needs
(including among such American lawyers most of the "sophisticated" snooters
at Pound).
Thus before I come to my own estimate of the value of the present work I
should like to repeat first that for the practicing lawyer whom the author used
to so impress with the sweep and learning of his after-dinner speeches, these
volumes are a store-house of what today is called continuing legal education. 6
Secondly, that the modem sophisticate finds here much of the fundament on
which he rests, and that most of him will find also a rude, shrewd challenge to
his provincial self-sufficiency, a challenge to move on into the work recorded
in other tongues than ours (including the Scandinavian, and the Russian), and
proof that such moving is needed and can pay.
These matters out of the way, what does this work, in the light of Roscoe
Pound's work in general, mean to the contemporary jurisprude ?
The author tells us that the job was planned and begun in 1911,7 completed
144 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910).

2 3 A.B.A.J. 55 (1917).
3 7 COLum. L. REv. 379 (1907).
4 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908).
5 (pts. 1-3) 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696 (1913), 14 id. 1, 103 (1914).
6 Such a lawyer should add, especially, (1) STONE, THm PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW

(1950), the best one-volume job on the whole field; its author was responsible for much of
the up-dating of the Pound footnotes. (2) REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN
PRO PBS (1951), which gives not only the best available whole-picture of Pound's work, but
also deals rather surely with many American writers whom Pound neglects. (3) COHEN &
COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1951), which is an admirable selection of first-hand

material, and which, in supplement to Pound's material, builds up the institutional and
operating side of law. (4) CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSoPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL (1949), tough

going, but extremely useful in the way in which it brings the elders to bear on current problems and thinking.
7 Vol. I, p. xi. SETARo, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND 4-5 (1942),

notes, in addition to the well-known Scope andPurpose of SociologicalJurisprudence(pts.
1-3), 24 HARv. L. REv. 591, 25 id. 140 (1911), 489 (1912), an original OUTLINES OF LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE CHIEFLY FROM AN ANALYTICAL STANDPOINT (67 pp.) from 1903, and an
original READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW (404 pp.) from 1904.

176

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:174

in 1952, and twice revised (1949-1952, 1956-1958).8 It must be taken as
the final full word of a titan who during forty or so of his 65 years of prolific
legal writing threatened to make American jurisprudence a one-man show.
Significantly, his first listed article, back in 1896, was The Influence of Civil
Law in America.9 Significantly again, in the ten preparatory years, even while
only five out of eighteen items appeared in other than local Nebraska publications, yet well more than half were jurisprudential. The first great paper, that
"mother of symphonies," came in 1906: The Causes ofPopularDissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice.O A paper-not merely a review-about
Pound's work is listed as early as 1914.11
One gets the impression that the major lines of the present book shaped up
rather early, along with the major insights. Thus as against Pound's Outlines of
Jurisprudence,3d ed. 1920, and 5th ed. 1943 (the two editions with which I
happen to be familiar), the present table of contents shows not too much
elaboration of basic plan between 1920 and 1943, and very little since. It is
worth noting, perhaps, that 1943's "Conditions of non-Restraint of natural
powers" has turned into one of "natural freedoms" (where the plural is of
course peculiarly useful to clear thinking); and that the "Law and ethics" of
1920 (an emphasis on writing and theory) and the "Law and morals" of 1943
(with necessary emphasis on practice and mores, along with theory) has
moved, in plan, into a rethought, reanalyzed, combination: "Law and Morals
-Jurisprudence and Ethics." The text does not realize this more mature plan,
but, even so, it represents a gratifying advance over one of Pound's less happy
early ventures. 12
The over-all scheme divides thus:
1. Jurisprudence.-Historyand "schools," some 350 pp.: mostly meat,
sometimes deep insight, sometimes superficiality. Thus I, pp. 34-38 on Greek
philosophy and Roman law seems to me mere words; and Savigny, in this part
and elsewhere, is dealt with in conventional stereotype and as if Kantorowicz's blinding paper 3 had never been written, and indeed as if "the" histori8 Vol. I, p. xii.
9 SETARO, op. cit. supra note 7, at 3.
10 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, reprinted 40 AM. L. Ray. 729 (1906), 14 AM. LAWYER 445 (1906),
20 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 178 (1937).
11SETrARo, op. cit. supra note 7, at 139.
12

LAW AND MoRALs (1924). This little book, though heavily documented, gets almost

nowhere, and Pound's wisdom shows in not using it as one of the prior works to be incorporated verbatim, or nearly so, into the final word. But that word (ch. X1) is itself not satisfactory in this area; its concern is too much with doctrine. Doctrine is indeed one lesser
phase of the relation of law and morals; but the bridge and the tension lie in practice-here
would have been, e.g., a place to discuss fiction in general, and such matters as modern
American consent divorce, with "ethics" as they hit judge and practitioner, legislator and
layman. Kant, Stammler, Kohler, etc., have stuff, but one wants to see ethics, for lawyers,
get down from "books" and into "action": the court-room and the office.
13 Savigny and the HistoricalSchool of Law, 53 L.Q. REv. 326 (1937).
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cal "school" had not, with Goldschmidt, blossomed in codification. In contrast, Ihering receives thoughtful treatment.
2. The End [-Goal] ofLaw, 187 pp.-One asks chiefly: Why the singular?
This type of over-simplifying of a complex set of issues recurs. For instance,
notwithstanding some four decades of insistence by Sunderland, Green, and
especially J. Frank, on the difference-peculiarly in a jury-culture-between
appellate justiciation and justiciation at trial, Pound still writes of "the judicial
process"; and again, notwithstanding the report in 1941-a time when Pound
was a central figure in the discussions-of the U.S. Attorney General's Commission on Administrative Procedure, we find the relevant discussion here full
of "the" administrative process, as if administrative processes did not come in
14
Heinz varieties.
3. The Nature of Law, 464 pp.-Theories of law; law and the state, and
morals; justice according to law (this last as fine and full as anything in the
book.)
4. The Scope and Subject Matter of Law: interests, 371 pp.-This is discussed below.
5. Sources, Forms, Modes of Growth, 362 pp.
6. Application and Enforcement ofLaw, 34 pp.-It escapes me why this is a
separate "part," rather than being added to "justice according to law," or else
really developed on its own by the author of Limits of Effective Legal Action
and co-editor of the Cleveland Crime Survey of 1919.
7. Analysis of GeneralJuristic Conceptions, 507 pp.-Rights, powers, nonrestraints, duties, persons, acts, things.
8. The System of Law, 713 pp.-Classification, proprietary rights, obligations, reparation, enforcement, comparative civil procedure. (But why should
"Law" be "private" law?)
Save for the problems of crime and governmental organization (which are
hardly brushed) international matters (which are scanted) and taxation,' 5 the
range is thus huge; it is worthy of Reuschlein's intitulation, "The Pre-emptive
Pound."16 The underlying data and literature have, as mentioned, a vastness
unfamiliar in American scholarship; Wigmore had something of the same
omnivorous quality, Radin had much of it and Seagle some, but in general it
14 This is strikingly so in one of the later-written (and useful) additions, in which Pound,
contrary to his older practice, recognizes and responds to an attack. The passage-it is HI,
469-72, based on The JudicialProcessin Action, 1 N.Y.L.F. 11 (1955)-is sprightly and has
power; but it misses the beauty of Dewey's exciting analysis (first put forward about
coevally with Pound's own first major effort on the theory "of judicial decision": Logical
Method andLaw, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924)); and the reason Pound misses here is, I think,
almost wholly because for him "the" judicial and "the" administrative stand as obscuring
over-simple entities between the eye and understanding.
Is Among matters not mentioned in the Index are Taxation, Budget, Defense, Military
Establishment, National Defense, and War.
16 REusctmN, op. cit. supra note 6.
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has been rare since Kent and Story. One of the main values of the present volumes lies in the results of these explorations, whenever Pound lets his results
take shape with enough detail to carry meaning. Thus, for instance, the comparative treatment of G6ny and Duguit17 is, except for its source,18 the most
illuminating job on the subject I have read; and G6ny is among us the most
neglected of the valuable Continental authors.
It is indeed in relation to this job on G6ny, excellent in itself, that I can
perhaps best indicate my own troubles with the book at large. The points are
two, and they are applicable throughout: (1) In the very process of discovering
and lauding G~ny's Science et Technique, Pound pushes off the Mithode as
having "no more than incidentally raised the questions as to values and made
some suggestions as to a measure."19 (My italics.) But the guts of the Mdthode
lies in the most magnificent single job that has ever been done of mediating,by
way of a single, simply formulated, way of work ("measure"), between any
ideal, and any authoritative text, and what proves in each case in hand to need
doing. G6ny's formula is not all-sufficient, but he added to it literal volumes of
specific application until, if you really read, you get by that very reading to
where you can do it for yourself in your sleep, and do it not so badly. This is
genius: it is also lawyering, it puts jurisprudence to work, for anybody. It is an
instance of that technique which the later book stresses as a matter of theoryand, as Pound sees it, rightly. Holmes muffed this aspect completely. 20 Patterson muffed it.21 Even Pound's versatile and sensitive sniffer really missed the
technique, too; nevertheless, in a day when Duguit was the fashion, Pound
smelled out G6ny as the sounder man.
This is Pound's sniffer at work. It is an amazing sniffer. It reminds me most
of the general genius of the American case-law judge: most of the time it is
amazingly on-target.And so rarely in the bull's eye. For Pound is of course not
in the bull's eye here. He recognizes G6ny's quest for "starting points" for legal
reasoning; but he just plain ducks discussion of what those starting points are
or should be. He recognizes the importance of technique, in general. But he
turns his back, then, on the craft-aspect, the daily working aspect for daily
working lawyers, of this great Mithode of G~ny's-even while, I repeat, he is
sniffing out the greatness which has been missed by every other American
writer except Cardozo. 22
17 Vol. I, pp. 181-89.
1
Pound's Fifty Years ofJurisprudence(pts. 1-2), 51 HAv. L. RIv. 444, 777, at 464-72
(1938), is abbreviated in the current text, whereas it deserved to be much expanded.
19
Vol. I, p. 182.
20
Holmes' Natural Law, 32 HAv. L. Rv. 40 (1918), started off as a review of G~ny's
Mdthode. I cannot believe that Holmes ever got beyond G~ny's second-rate philosophical
introduction. The latter's philosophy matures in the later work, but it never achieves a
stature comparable to the method of the Mthode.
21
JURISpRUDENCF-MEN AND IDEAS OF TBE LAW (1953), 353-54.
22
NATuRE oF THE JuDIcIAL PRocEss (1921), passim.
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The second point illustrated is Pound's preference for the study of theory,
verbalized theory, writer's theory, over study of results, or of how it gets done:
over process and know-how either in the concrete or in theory. G~ny's Mithode
(if I may quote from Pound in a not dissimilar context about our appellate
courts) seemed to him only to "ring changes on the familiar," so he went on to
G~ny's theoretical discussions.
Let me try to state it this way: Pound has contributed, for my guess, more
than any other individual (unless perhaps John Dewey) to making legal
thought in this country result-minded, cause-minded, and process-minded.
Yet such lines of thinking leave little mark upon the whole, and almost no
marks upon the structure, of these final volumes.
Let me illustrate: by 1903, we have Outlines, Chiefly from the Analytical
Standpoint.Those 67 pages get developed, with love and skill, into more than
1200 working pages of the final word. Contrast the relative non-use here of the
famous and seminal basic articles published up to say 1910. The Theory of
Interests itself, the Poundians' delight, which one might have hoped to see
developed as the true center of a Sociological Jurisprudence, as the place
where one really gets down to cases, comes in for only 371 pages. The Interests
themselves are slighted. They are developed with no similar love. Take as an
instance "Security of Transactions," an old, old friend: In connection with
Ehrlich23 there is indeed a suggestion about the importance of what is relied on
by the people doing the transaction; for a moment Pound shows there even in
regard to commercial matters the sensitivity which he brought so powerfully
to his System. But by the time the guts are reached (the Interests) it is as if
neither Ehrlich, nor Ely (unmentioned 24) nor Cohen & Cohen (also unmentioned25), nor Hershey's work (though it, too, is cited previously)-nor, to
push forward, the interesting effects of a compulsory labor bargain on the old
law of offer-and-acceptance-had ever been around. 26 Neither is there any
concrete discussion of one of the leading modem German figures, Heck, although there is a 1914 paper of his cited, 27 and although his influential
Interessenjurisprudenz surely demanded the attention of any follower of
Ihering, and had long been in full print, directly devoted to "interests" and
even to transactions. 28 Fuller's paper on form in contracts 29 is another source
23 Vol. 1, pp. 334-37.
24 So far as discovered.
25 So far as discovered.

26 This is the type of systematizing point frequently developed in Parts 7 and 8: in a business negotiation "for a contract" one has the familiar offer, counter-offer, etc., sequence.
In a labor negotiation "for a contract," points get tied down one by one. The two theories
"of formation of contract" have never been harmonized: Which is the right theory?
27 1 have mislaid the reference.
28 E.g., Grundriss des Schuldrechts (1929); Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz

(1932); Interessenjurisprudenz(1933).
29
Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. Rav. 799 (1941).
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of value which goes unregarded. In the case of my own What Price Contract?30
one can be sure that the disregard was not due to oversight, because Pound
and I, at the time, had been collaborating in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences article on Contract of which the paper was an immediate offshoot; and
one can be sure that the disregard is not due to Pound's regarding the author
as valueless, because he treats me in the main with more than gentleness: he
sometimes even uses me to build on. Such treatment, or neglect, of the workings of a major "interest" can, it seems to me, be explained only by lack of
interest. In similar fashion, the elaborate development of "the" theory of the
corporate "person"31 proceeds without touching the exciting and troubling
problems of the government corporation, and substantially as if there had
never been the commandite, G.m.b.H., or close corporation problem, and certainly without treatment of Berle and Means or of the SEC. So the theory of
inheritance 32 is developed from "The Indo-European peoples," but says nothing, for example, of the seeming effects of English primogeniture on colonial
expansion, or of the philosophy or effects of modern inheritance taxation. So,
finally, in developing either Proprietary Rights33 or Property as an Interest, 34
there is no wrestling with that shift of American "private" property law into
the "public law" field which has characterized zoning, water, minerals, and
urban redevelopment.
Now, let me repeat, no man in his senses who has either read Pound or seen
Pound in action can believe that ideas of this kind are beyond his reach. Nothing has ever been beyond his reach. Such ideas are instead, I suggest again,
outside his range of interest; the inoculation of Pound with Ehrlich simply did
not take.
Try this hypothesis, to put all of this together.
Suppose that Pound's native bent has all along been really in those areas of
"System" with which he began, and which he has managed to develop, these
later years, in the teeth of all or any of those multitudinous demands on his
time which have derived from administrative or from emergency pressures:
Pound has always loved abstract theories. He has always loved them best
when they came readily available, in other peoples' writing, for his own careful, penetrating, and systematic analysis. One can instance his sorting and dissection of the various single-line theories of "juristic person," already referred
to. Each theory he tests with clean scalpel, as to whether it explains the whole.
Each theory fails. At the end comes a brilliant synthesis;35 but the origin-oftheory aspects of Interpretationsof Legal History (where Pound, independently, matched one of Pareto's most significant contributions) has no part in
either the presentation or the synthesis. It is quite characteristic that Dewey's
30 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931).

33 Vol. V,

31 Vol. IV, p. 191 and very nice at 260-61.
2 See especially vol. Ir, 142 pages.

34

pp. 77-195.

E.g., vol. III, pp. 105-55.
35 Vol. IV, pp. 260-61.
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theory36 (which is the best) is not mentioned (much as Dewey's exploration of
the appellate judge's operation is left to Cairns' interpretation). Dewey's lines
of thought just do not fit the Pound mind. The Dewey emphasis, indeed the
Dewey necessity, was always to reach for effects, for function, for "what it has
been doing."
My net judgment comes to this:
If, contrary to the basic Pound nature (gathering, observing, portraying,
arranging-with a reasonable feel for growth), the times called-as they did
call, 3 7 for process-and-result-directed work, then the most versatile legal
scholar in our history could produce that, too. And he did, out of a cornucopia, until the 1914 papers; one can even add, though in much lesser measure,
The Theory ofJudicial Decision in 1923.38
If, moreover, there is in the Pound nature a deep, passionate love for the
American judicial approach to the things of law, and so for judicial supremacy
(two things)-then there ought to be-and there is-one functioning and functional piece really developed in the final book-"the judicial process"-and
that may explain why Justice According to Law grows and shines in these final
volumes.
But if the Pound nature did not take, by its nature, to problems of how
things work, and especially not to the dirty detail and to the working out of
theory about detailed process, then one can understand why pressures of time
and circumstance could keep the Old Master from developing theories of
process, while at the same time setting him free to develop theories of structure.
36 Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655

(1926).
37 There was at the turn of the century a ferment-period of process- and result-directed
work in the social disciplines (sparked and symbolized, I have always thought, by the first
Roosevelt). Consider, in general, Chicago and Wisconsin in Economics, Sociology, Government, Philosophy. Consider, more particularly, Dewey, Veblen, Ely, Ross, Mitchell, Commons, Merriam, Thomas. Consider, then, in law, and in relation to a proud Nebraskan, the
following titles in addition to those mentioned above: The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLum. L.
REv. 20 (1905); Do We Need a Philosophy ofLaw?5 COLUM. L. REv. 339 (1905); Executive
Justice,55 Am. L. REGISTER 136 (1907); The Need of a SociologicalJurisprudence,19 GREEN
BAG 607 (1907); Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. Rnv. 383 (1908) (Here Pound
"made" his first goal: the HarvardLawReview. That Review was only five or ten years late,
in recognition); Enforcementof Law, 20 GREEN BAG 401 (1908); Liberty of Contract,18 YALE
L.J. 454 (1909). These go on: Puritanismand the Common Law, 45 AM. L. REv. 811 (1911)
(rather deep); The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence(pts. 1-3), 24 HARv. L.

REv. 591 (1911), 25 id. 140 (1911), 1489 (1912); Democracy andthe Common Law, 18 CAsE &
CoM. 447 (1912); Social Problems and the Courts, 18 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 331 (1912); Social
Justice and Legal Justice, 75 CENT. L.J. 455 (1912); Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. Sci.
Rv. 361 (1913); The Organizationof Courts, 70 LEGAL INTELLIGENcER 86 (1913); The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HAv. L. REv. 302 (1913); Legislation as a
Social Function, 18 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 755 (1913),
By 1924 the net tone of the titles has completely changed.
38 (pts. 1-3) 36 HARv. L. REv. 641, 802, 940 (1923).
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I cannot tell. What I can report to jurisprudes is this:
The number of holes you (or 1) can pick in these volumes is, if you are a
pick-ax fan, gratifying. They are not at all that gathering and ordering of
Pound's insights and knowledge for which many of us have been hoping. You
find here, for example, few traces of his thought about judicial organization,
or about the bar, or about dealing with crime.
On the other hand, the number of holes in your (or my) equipment for
sound thinking on our own problems, of today,which these volumes offer good
cement to fill: that is dismaying.
Ave, Caesarl
K. N. LLEWELLYN*
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago

Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior. By GLENDON A. ScHUBERT. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Pp. xxi, 392. $7.50.
Any law tribunal presents this puzzle: since for any one case both the facts
and the law are given to each judge (or juror for that matter) in exactly the
same form, what causes them in many instances to arrive at different conclusions ? The mystery is only partly clarified if the judges, as is the custom in our
appellate courts, state the reasons for their differing views in written opinions.
These opinions normally clarify only the exact points of disagreement, identifying the fact or rule of law which is interpreted differently or given different
weight. Much of the puzzle remains. What is the source of the difference? Is it
likely to recur in a similar case in a way that may affect the result? Glendon
Schubert's substantial volume is the most ambitious of the several attempts in
recent years to utilize statistical methods to explore these and other puzzling
problems of judicial behavior.
Schubert employs four distinct research techniques with ingenuity and
perseverance. A long chapter on "summary decision-making" at the outset of
his book analyzes the work of the Supreme Court in terms of its own published statistics; a second section builds on C. H. Pritchett's analysis of voting
blocs; a third section, expanding on the interesting work of J. Tanenhaus and
F. Kort, discusses the predictive possibilities of scalogram and content analysis of Supreme Court opinions; and a fourth section, very much the author's
own original contribution, attempts to apply game theory to judicial decisionmaking. Thus the book is statistics throughout, statistics that are never dull
and which are poised at every page to suggest intriguing solutions. The novelty
and interest of Schubert's research make it all the more unfortunate that his
work is so beset with shortcomings that the solutions are often more intriguing
than meritorious.

